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Abstract
This paper shows why a majority of legislators may vote for a policy that benefits
a firm but harms all legislators. The firm may induce legislators to support the policy
by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district where voters or their rep-
resentative support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, so each
legislator who seeks the firm’s investment votes for the policy, though all legislators
would be better off if they all voted against the policy. And when votes reveal infor-
mation about the district, the firm’s implicit promise or threat can be credible. Unlike
influence mechanisms based on contributions or bribes, the behavior considered is time
consistent and in line with the low campaign contributions by special interests.
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1 Introduction
A special interest, which we will call a firm, is commonly viewed as incurring a cost when
lobbying for a policy it favors. But the opposite view, pursued here, can also be fruitful:
the voters or politicians seek a favor from the firm, paying for it by supporting a policy the
special interest favors.
The behavior we consider was well captured by Lawrence O’Brien, who had served as
Special Assistant to presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, as Postmaster
General of the United States, and as National Chairman of the Democratic Party. In an oral
interview1 he said
The NFL [National Football League] enjoyed an excellent relationship with the
Congress. Some of it was, however, on the basis of NFL expansion–where the NFL
might locate in the future and the constant quest on the part of some members
for a franchise location in their state... Over the course of time, expansion was
effectively played off against legislation, to the benefit of the NFL...This was an
internal matter in the Congress. The league operated directly with the Congress.
They could pick their spots and they effectively utilized this leverage that they
had... [They held off] decisions on franchises, because if you had a half a dozen
to a dozen possible sites and that involved ten or twelve states, you were in a
pretty good position.
The analysis below formalizes this idea, supposing that a legislator who votes for a policy
a firm wants may thereby attract a firm’s investment to his district. If no legislator is decisive,
1Transcript, Lawrence F. O’Brien Oral History Interview XVII, 12/17/86, by Michael L. Gillette, Internet
Copy, LBJ Library.
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then a single legislator’s vote does not determine policy, so that a legislator may vote for the
policy the firm favors even if the policy adopted hurts all districts.
Such behavior can explain the puzzle of the surprisingly small rent-seeking expenditures
by special interest groups, first noted by Tullock (1972), who asked why campaign contri-
butions, then amounting to about $200 million, were so small compared to the hundreds of
billions of public spending and regulatory costs supposedly at stake.
Consider later data. In 1998 total contributions by political action committees (PACs)
were only $220 million, of which corporate PACs accounted for 35% (Milyo, Primo and
Groseclose 2000). Limited importance of PAC contributions are found by McCarty and
Rothenberg (1996), who analyze contributions from the largest PACs operating during the
1978-1986 election cycles; the mean of non-zero contributions was only $700 for corporate
PACs.
Spending has of course increased over time. Across all US elections in 2004, total spending
was about $4 billion (Stratmann 2005). Total spending in the 2010 midterm elections in
the United States, including spending by political parties, congressional candidates, and
independent groups, was about $4 billion.2
But not all this spending is by firms seeking special benefits, and this spending is trivial
compared to federal spending on rescuing firms during the Great Recession, such as the more
than $500 billion committed under the Troubled Asset Relief Program.3
Nor does evidence show that contributions consistently influence how legislators vote.
2Danielle Kurtzleben “$4 billion in election spending a drop in the bucket.” http :
//www.usnews.com/news/articles/2010/11/09/4 − billion − in − election − spending − a − drop − in −
the− bucket.html downloaded December 29, 2010.
3Nor is the size of illegal contributions large. Investigations following the Watergate scandal found that 21
companies made illegal contributions in 1972, totaling only $968,000; the largest one was made by Northrop
for a mere $150,000 (Alexander 1980).
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Some evidence for an effect is given by Stratmann (2005), who finds that an extra $10,000
in banking contributions increases by approximately eight percentage points the likelihood
of a House member voting in favor of the banking industry. The timing of interest group
contributions, with some coming just before important roll-call votes, also suggests that
special-interest groups attempt to influence legislative voting (Stratmann 1998).
Other evidence is in sharp contrast. A review of nearly 40 studies by Ansolabehere, de
Figueiredo, and Snyder (2003) finds the estimated effects of campaign contributions to be
either statistically insignificant or to have the wrong sign in roughly 75% of the cases. The
regressions they estimate show thin evidence that campaign contributions much influence
congressional votes.
2 Literature
Special interest groups may influence legislators by buying influence and also by informing
policymakers.4 A legislator’s voting decision might also be influenced by the possibility of
obtaining local benefits. Our analysis relates to all three strands of literature.
2.1 Lobbies buy influence
A classic analysis of how special interests may influence public policy is Tullock (1980), who
considers rent-seeking contests. In models of rent seeking a contest success function trans-
lates a special interest’s spending on influencing policies into the probability that government
4Models that combine both influence instruments are Bennedsen and Feldmann (2006), and Dahm and
Porteiro (2008a, 2008b). In these models special interests choose between providing policy-relevant infor-
mation or engaging in non-informational influence activities (such as by making campaign contributions).
3
adopts the policy the special interest favors. This approach, as usually postulated, suffers
from a commitment problem: after rent-seeking efforts are exerted, the utility-maximizing
choice for a policymaker need not be to adopt a policy in accord with the probability specified
by the contest success function.5 Rent extraction, in which politicians obtain payments from
a firm by threatening costly taxes or regulations also suffers from a commitment problem—if
the firm does not make the payments demanded, then, in the absence of reputational con-
siderations, the government may not gain from imposing the costs on the firm (McChesney
1987).
A different approach considers menu auctions (see Grossman and Helpman 1994). The
model is usually applied to determine the value of a continuous policy variable government
will set in response to payment from firms in affected industries. Each firm is assumed to
make an (implicit) offer relating prospective contributions to the policies chosen by the gov-
ernment. The government then sets a policy vector (Grossman and Helpman 1994 consider
a set of import and export taxes).
This approach suffers from two weaknesses that our approach overcomes. First, a menu
auction effectively considers bribery, which in most democracies is illegal, and is often un-
popular with voters. Second, it assumes that each firm can commit to a payment. But, of
course, after the government sets policy, each firm would gain by reneging on the promised
payment. Nor does it appear that policymakers punish special interests: McCarty and
Rothenberg (1996) find that incumbents do not punish lobbying groups who had not sup-
ported them (or who had supported their opponents) in a prior election.
5Analyzing a game with two rent-seekers, Corcho´n and Dahm (2010) show that some contest success func-
tions can be derived as a utility-maximizing choice from a setting in which rent-seekers are uncertain about
the type of politician. Corcho´n and Dahm (2011) derive contest success functions without the commitment
assumption. See also the literature reviewed in these papers.
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In a menu auction, firms commit to contingent payments, and in equilibrium pay the
policy maker. A different strategy, examined by Dal Bo´ (2007), can have the firm influence
policy while paying almost nothing: if a strong majority of legislators can be induced to vote
for the firm’s policy, then no legislator is decisive, and therefore each is indifferent between
voting for and against the policy. The firm can then induce legislators to support it by
committing to pay a legislator if and only if he casts a decisive vote in its favor.
Our paper builds on Dal Bo´ (2007) in examining behavior when a vote is not decisive. But
we differ in several ways. We let a legislator’s reward be the same when his vote is decisive
as when it is not. In his paper legislators face a multilateral prisoners’ dilemma, whereas in
our paper they do not. We thus allow legislators to have stronger incentives to cooperate
(and to reject the firm’s policy). Such cooperation makes it more difficult for a firm to get its
way, and in this sense our paper offers a stronger result. Our stronger result comes, however,
at the cost of less generality, because legislators do not have a dominant voting strategy. So
in contrast to Dal Bo´ (2007) our result does not hold under sequential voting. Moreover,
our analysis requires some different assumptions because it explores how politicians want
to influence lobbyists rather than the other way around. So we consider time-consistent
behavior, whereas Dal Bo´ has special interests that must commit to contingent payments.
2.2 Lobbies inform legislators
Our discussion of lobbying relates to the literature that considers how lobbyists may inform
policymakers. The information can concern the importance of the problem a legislator is
considering (Hansen 1991; Smith 1995), the effectiveness of policy (Krehbiel 1991; Smith
1995), and the electoral consequences of different policies (Kingdon 1984; Hansen 1991).
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A legislator who is uncertain about what policy positions would best help his reelection
may listen to interest groups with private information about constituency opinion, with the
interest groups in turn persuading a legislator that his political self-interest lies in taking
group-friendly positions.6 Data indeed show that organizations are granted access by Mem-
bers of Congress when the organizations know more than other potential informants about
constituent preferences, issues, and other representatives (Hansen 1991).
Relatedly, legislators may grant access to organized interests because of the informational
subsidies groups provide (see Hall 2000): lobbyists selectively subsidize the information and
legislative labor costs of members who already agree with them. Lobbyists can thus make it
easier for a legislator to work more on a policy objective she has in common with the group.
Legislators in turn act as if they were working for the group, when instead they work only
to benefit themselves. The information that legislators seek can also relate to the effects of
policy (Lohmann 1995; Wright 1996).
We differ from this strand of the literature by looking at the opposite path, how votes
inform firms. Empirical support for our assumption that policy can signal a jurisdiction’s
type appears in Raff and Srinivasan (1998), who suppose that a firm that is initially uncertain
about business conditions in a host country may infer that a government which offers tax
incentives signals favorable business conditions. The data they report are consistent with
such a signaling model.
6For works arguing that special interests inform legislators about political consequences of legislative votes,
see Smith (1984), Hansen (1991), Austen-Smith (1993), Austen-Smith and Wright (1992, 1994), Rasmussen
(1993) and Lohmann (1995, 1998).
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2.3 Local benefits
Our consideration of benefits to a district or group relates to work that supposes that a
leader of a group can induce turnout by granting members of his group private benefits.7
How legislators can obtain local benefits is discussed by Bernheim, Rangel, and Rayo (2006),
who analyze legislative policy making when the default policy changes from period to period,
and the agenda setter in each period offers a policy that depends on past policies. Under such
conditions, a majority may support a pork-barrel policy that hurts almost every legislator.
This result resembles ours in the sense that (almost) all legislators would be better off if
there were no vote. However, the institution Bernheim, Rangel, and Rayo (2006) examine
differs from ours, and so has different voting incentives. In particular, we let a legislator
who votes for a policy the firm favors win a reward independently of whether the policy is
adopted; that is not true in the pork-barrel setting. Another important difference is that,
unlike us, Bernheim, Rangel, and Rayo (2006) assume that legislators vote sincerely, as if
each was always pivotal. We allow a legislator to recognize that his vote may not be decisive.
3 Assumptions
The legislature considers a policy that benefits a firm and is costly to citizens. The policy can
be a tax break for the firm, an increase in a federally regulated price, a grant of monopoly
power (such as by an anti-trust exemption or an extension of a patent), a protective tariff,
and so on. For concreteness, we shall speak of a tariff. The tariff increases the firm’s profits
7See Uhlaner (1989) and Schwartz (1987), who discuss a “local public benefit” to a group that increases
with the number of votes the winner received from that group. Lapp (1999), however, testing the model,
finds little empirical evidence that ethnic leaders can increase turnout among their followers.
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by F , at a cost of C to each of the n > 2 districts. To make the problem interesting,
suppose the net benefit of the tariff for society is negative: F < nC. Indeed, we can make
the stronger assumption that the tariff is bad even when confined to a mere majority of
districts: (n + 1)C/2 > F .8 The tariff can be bad because it distorts both production and
consumption choices, creating a deadweight loss: the increased profits to the firm are thus
less than the loss in consumer surplus.
The firm contemplates an investment, say a new factory. In each district, voters, or
their legislator, may view the investment as either good (giving a benefit of g) or as bad
(imposing a cost of b).9 Voters may favor the investment because it creates jobs or increases
incomes. Voters may oppose the investment because of environmental concerns. Again, we
are interested in situations with C > g: the benefit to the district from the investment is
less than the cost to it of the tariff. Notice that this implies that voters would prefer that
the tariff not be considered, even at the cost of no investment by the firm.
Denote the number of districts that favor the investment by m, where m is at least as
large as a majority of districts plus one, or m ≥ 1 + (n+ 1)/2. To simplify the notation, the
consequence of investment in a district is denoted by pi ∈ {−b, g}. A legislator from a district
with consequence g favors the investment; a legislator from a district with consequence −b
opposes it.
The firm prefers to invest in a district favoring the investment over investing in a dis-
trict opposing it. The firm, however, is initially unaware of the views in each district; it
knows only the proportion γ = m/n of districts favoring the investment, which is common
8For brevity, we take n to be an odd number.
9The firm may invest with probability less than one. The values of g and b can then be taken as expected
values.
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knowledge. The legislator from each district knows whether his district would gain or lose
from the investment.10 This is a simple set-up in which the firm may find a legislator’s vote
informative. The information may refer to the preferences of voters, but the preferences of
politicians might be more important. At the time of an election voters may not have thought
about attracting a firm, and no polls were then taken on the subject. So a firm cares deeply
about what the political class thinks—smart politicians can figure out what voters want,
or a selfish politician may consider how an investment will change the composition of the
electorate and so election outcomes.
The firm may prefer to invest in a district favoring the investment for several reasons.
The firm may want a favorable business climate, where it will face little litigation, will easily
secure environmental and zoning approvals, and so on. Or the firm may prefer to locate in
a district where many workers (and so, by implication many voters) would want to work at
such a firm: it could then offer a lower wage, choose from a larger pool of workers, enjoy
the productivity benefits of high morale, and so on. Indeed, empirical evidence shows that
support from a local politician can much increase a firm’s profits.11 The behavior of the firm
in our model thus differs from offering bribes. We usually think of a bribe as costly to the
briber, whereas we have a firm take an action (invest in a district that favors it) from which
the firm benefits.
10In Subsection 6.1 we relax the assumptions that m ≥ 1 + (n+ 1)/2 and that the proportion of districts
favoring the investment is common knowledge. We could also describe our setting as follows. First, nature
assigns types to legislators (so that with probability γ a legislator favors the investment) and each legislator
knows his type. This implies that m could be very small and our assumption on m just says that we focus on
realizations in which m is larger. Then, each legislator gets a perfect signal concerning the other legislators’
types. The firm does not receive this signal. Under this interpretation Subsection 6.1 investigates robustness
when neither legislators nor the firm receive a signal and m ≥ 1 + (n+ 1)/2 need not hold.
11Faccio and Parsley (2009) show that the sudden death of a politician causes a 1.7% decline in the value
of companies headquartered in the politician’s home town. This decline is followed by a decline in the rate
of growth in sales and a decline in access to credit.
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Each legislator votes for or against the tariff. The tariff is adopted if a simple majority
of legislators, with one legislator per district, votes for it.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Each legislator recognizes whether an investment by the firm would benefit or harm
him.
2. A legislator votes for or against the tariff.
3. If a majority of legislators vote for the tariff, it is imposed.
4. The firm chooses where to invest, independently of whether the tariff is imposed.
5. Payoffs are realized.
4 Benchmark result
As in many other voting situations, the one studied here has many equilibria. One equilib-
rium is particularly compelling. Our approach is therefore to characterize this equilibrium
quickly and to postpone the analysis of other equilibria.
To do so we simplify the analysis in this section in two ways. First, we assume that
the firm infers that a legislator who votes for the tariff comes from a district which favors
the investment; we check informally when this inference is consistent with how legislators
vote. This simplification allows us to look at Nash equilibria of a simultaneous voting game
rather than at Perfect Bayesian equilibria of the whole game, and will be relaxed later (in
Subsection 5.4).
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Second, the focus is on a symmetric equilibrium with pure strategies. “Symmetry” here
means that each legislator who favors the investment uses the same strategy as that used by
the other legislators favoring the investment, and similarly for every legislator who opposes
the investment.12 The next section extends the analysis to consider asymmetric pure-strategy
equilibria (in Subsection 5.1) and symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria (in Subsection 5.2).
Consider a legislator’s choices. Denote by k the number of other legislators voting for the
tariff, and remember that pi ∈ {−b, g} indicates the district’s payoff from the investment. In
two situations the legislator’s vote is not pivotal, that is, the collective decision is independent
of any one legislator’s vote. And so in both situations the legislator’s vote does not affect
whether the cost C of the tariff is imposed. But a legislator who votes for the tariff may
attract the firm’s investment to his district.13 In the first situation the legislator in question
knows that, excluding himself, a majority of legislators vote against the tariff, that is, k ≤
(n− 3)/2.14 Here a legislator strictly prefers voting for the tariff if and only if
pi
k + 1
>

0 if k > 0
pi
n
if k = 0
(1)
If all legislators vote against the tariff, the firm learns nothing, and chooses randomly where
to invest.
In the second situation, the legislator in question knows that, excluding himself, a major-
12Obviously, we do not require a legislator favoring the investment to use the same strategy as a legislator
opposing the investment, with the labels ‘voting for’ and ‘voting against’ swapped.
13Strictly speaking, we assume that a district that does not want the investment cannot prevent the firm
from locating in the district. Incorporating such a veto power, Proposition 1 below still holds, although the
strategy of the legislators from districts that oppose the investment is then weakly dominant.
14Note that, by definition of n and k, n− k − 1 other legislators vote against the tariff, who constitute a
majority if n− k − 1 ≥ (n+ 1)/2, implying k ≤ (n− 3)/2.
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ity of legislators vote for the tariff, that is, k ≥ (n+ 1)/2, implying that a legislator strictly
prefers to vote for the tariff if and only if
pi
k + 1
− C > −C. (2)
Note that when k > 0 equations (1) and (2) are equivalent. The intuition is that in either
case the legislator is not pivotal and so all that matters is how his vote affects the legislator’s
expected benefit from the firm’s investment. On the other hand, when k = (n − 1)/2 the
legislator’s vote is pivotal and the legislator’s vote matters for both the approval of the tariff
and the firm’s decision where to invest. Here a legislator votes for the tariff if and only if
pi
k + 1
− C > 0, (3)
or, since k = (n − 1)/2, 2pi/(n + 1) − C > 0. Intuitively, a pivotal legislator votes for the
tariff only if the possible gains from increasing the chance of attracting the firm’s investment
outweigh the cost of the tariff to his district.
Consider a legislator who dislikes the investment (pi = −b). From the above equations
(1), (2) and (3), we see that voting against the tariff is a strictly dominant strategy.
Now consider a legislator who favors the investment (pi = g). By analogous reasoning,
when C/g < 2/(n+ 1), voting for the tariff is a strictly dominant strategy. For higher values
of C/g, voting for a tariff is not the dominant strategy.
Consider, however, the following voting profile in which each legislator who favors the
investment votes for the tariff, and every other legislator uses his strictly dominant strategy
12
to vote against the tariff. By our assumption on m, at least (n + 1)/2 other legislators
vote for the tariff. Therefore no legislator’s vote is decisive, the trade-off in equation (2) is
relevant, and a legislator favoring the investment votes for the tariff. The result can hold
even if the district gains very little from the investment, either because the benefits of the
investment are small, or because only with small probability will the firm invest anywhere
at all. Nor does the result require that each district whose legislator votes for the tariff have
an equal chance of attracting the investment; the result does require that a district is more
likely to attract the investment if its legislator votes for the tariff than if he votes against.
The legislators’ votes are consistent with the firm’s inference. If a legislator favoring the
investment votes for the tariff, whereas a legislator opposing the investment votes against
the tariff, then the firm will rationally conclude that it would profit more by investing in a
district whose legislator voted for the tariff than by investing in a district whose legislator
voted against it. Thus, indeed, the firm is more likely to invest in a district whose legislator
voted for the tariff.
Note also that it is not an equilibrium for all legislators to vote against the tariff: no
legislator would be decisive, and a legislator could then attract the investment to his district
by voting for the tariff (see equation (1) with k = 0).15
We summarize with
Proposition 1 There exists a unique Nash equilibrium in symmetric pure strategies to the
simultaneous voting game. In this equilibrium all legislators who favor the investment vote for
the tariff; all other legislators vote against the tariff, and the tariff is approved. If the benefits
15Besides the two voting profiles described above, two other symmetric strategy profiles are candidates for
an equilibrium. Each, however, requires legislators who do not favor investment to use a strictly dominated
strategy.
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to the districts that favor the investment are sufficiently large, that is, if C/g < 2/(n + 1),
then this equilibrium is in strictly dominant strategies.
Of course, after the tariff is adopted and the investment is made, legislators may want
to end the tariff. The firm may therefore favor a policy that is not easily reversed; for
example, the tariff may appear as an amendment to an international environmental treaty
that imposes sanctions on non-complying countries, or control over trade barriers may be
delegated to an agency that is expected to favor the firm. And if the firm is expected to
make further investments in future periods, the logic presented here would also apply to
votes on ending a tariff—the equilibrium may have a majority of legislators oppose ending
a tariff.
A firm could also become informed about the district by asking each legislator whether
his district favors the firm’s investment. A legislator’s answer is cheap talk (see Crawford
and Sobel 1982), with information credibly revealed because no district has an incentive to
lie. The firm, however, gains from investing preferentially in districts that support the policy
the firm favors, as this allows the policy the firm favors to be approved. Suppose further that
the firm will favor a district that votes for a tariff over a district that merely says it wants
the firm to invest in that district. Then it cannot be an equilibrium for districts merely to
state that they favor the investment, rather than voting for it. For if fewer than a majority
of districts vote for the tariff, then any one district favoring the investment strictly prefers to
vote for the tariff rather than merely engage in cheap talk. And the same holds if a majority
of districts vote for the tariff. Note further that the firm loses nothing by claiming that it
will favor a district that votes for the tariff over a district that merely says it wants the
investment. And so the firm’s strategy is credible.
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Measuring social welfare by the sum of the utilities of the districts and of the firm, we
easily see that the outcome can be inefficient. In the unique equilibrium, a majority votes
for the tariff—the firm gains F , while the districts collectively lose nC. The inefficiency
arises because for efficiency the benefits and costs of the tariff matter (F and C), but
in equilibrium each legislator bases his vote on his district’s gain or loss from attracting
the firm’s investment (pi ∈ {−b, g}). For the same reason, there might be an inefficient
equilibrium in strictly dominant strategies.16
The preceding supposes that votes on the tariff allow the firm to benefit from matching
the firm’s investment location to a district favoring the investment. If the benefits from
good matches are low as compared to the net costs of the tariff, then the inefficiency is not
reversed.17 We state this result with
Proposition 2 If the welfare costs of the tariff are sufficiently high, that is if C is high in
comparison to F , then the outcome of the collective decision is inefficient.
Note that this result differs from logrolling, in which a legislator votes for a policy that
benefits other districts because he thereby gains support for a policy that benefits his district
(see Mueller 1989: 82-95, for a survey of this literature). Under logrolling, a majority votes for
a set of policies that, in the aggregate, benefit members of the majority. We are considering
a policy, or a set of policies, which hurt the districts whose legislators vote for it.
16To see that an equilibrium with a dominant strategy is compatible with an inefficiency, consider the
example in which g = F = 1. It must hold that F/n < C and C/g < 2/(n + 1). These expressions define
a non-empty interval for C described by 1/n < C < 2/(n + 1). But, of course, as the inefficiency becomes
increasingly severe, the equilibrium is no longer in dominant strategies.
17This argument can be made precise. Denote by Fm the firm’s benefits from a successful match. In the
unique equilibrium, social welfare is F − nC + Fm + g. Suppose the alternative has no vote on the tariff,
with the firm deciding randomly where to invest. Then γ(Fm + g) + (1− γ)(−b). If (1− γ)(Fm + g + b) is
smaller than −(F − nC), the inefficiency is not reversed.
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5 Other equilibria
The benchmark result demonstrated the existence of an equilibrium in which the legislature
adopts a tariff that all districts oppose. This section considers other equilibria. There can
exist an asymmetric equilibrium in pure strategies in which the tariff is rejected, and a se-
quential equilibrium in which the tariff is rejected. An equilibrium exists in which legislators
who dislike the investment vote for the tariff, and legislators who favor the investment vote
against the tariff. And there exists a symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies in which
the tariff is adopted with positive probability. We discuss these possibilities below, but ar-
gue that the one established in Proposition 1 often describes reality: we do not argue that
government will always adopt a policy that hurts all districts, but rather that under some
plausible conditions it may.
5.1 Asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria
Equilibria with asymmetric pure strategies can appear when C/g ≥ 2/(n + 1). To see this,
consider the strategy profile where k = (n− 1)/2 legislators favoring the investment vote for
the tariff and all others vote against, so that the tariff is rejected. Here legislators opposing
the investment use a strictly dominant strategy. The legislators voting for the tariff are not
pivotal and following equation (1) behave optimally. A legislator favoring the investment
and voting against the tariff is pivotal. As captured in equation (3), such a legislator also
behaves optimally.
But even allowing for equilibria with asymmetric pure strategies, the solution in Propo-
sition 1 remains an equilibrium and can explain why a legislature adopts an inefficient policy
16
though lobbying expenditures are very low.
The relevant question then is, which equilibrium is more likely to appear? We think it is
the symmetric one, because in an asymmetric equilibrium legislators of the same type behave
differently. The asymmetry requires explaining why some legislators can preempt others and
free-ride on the negative vote of other legislators. In other words, asymmetric behavior by
legislators should be based on some underlying asymmetry among legislators which should
be modeled explicitly. A natural explanation would be a sequential voting procedure. We
consider this institutional arrangement in Subsection 5.3.
5.2 Symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria
An equilibrium can also have each legislator who favors the investment vote for the tariff with
positive probability less than one. By voting for the tariff he would trade off the increased
chance of attracting the investment against the increased probability that the inefficient tariff
will be adopted.
Consider a given legislator who favors the investment. Suppose that each of the other
m − 1 legislators favoring the investment votes for the tariff with probability x. Assume
further that all legislators opposing the investment vote against the tariff. If the legislator
votes for the tariff, then his district has a chance of attracting the investment, whatever
the realizations of the other legislators’ mixed strategies. Moreover, when enough legislators
vote for the tariff, the cost C is incurred. More precisely, expected payoffs are given by
m−1∑
k=0
m− 1
k
xk(1− x)m−1−k gk + 1 −
m−1∑
k=n−1
2
m− 1
k
xk(1− x)m−1−k C.
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On the other hand, a legislator who votes against the tariff would attract the firm’s
investment to his district only when all other legislators vote against. Here also the cost
C must be incurred—but only when there are enough votes for the tariff excluding the
legislator’s vote. Expected payoffs are thus
(1− x)m−1 g
n
−
m−1∑
k=n+1
2
m− 1
k
xk(1− x)m−1−k C.
A legislator favoring the investment is indifferent between voting for and against the tariff
if and only if the expected benefits of attracting the firm’s investment for all the possible
realizations of the other legislators mixed strategies equal the expected benefits of voting
against the tariff when the legislator is pivotal. Formally, we have that
(1− x)m−1 n− 1
n
g +
m−1∑
k=1
m− 1
k
xk(1− x)m−1−k gk + 1
must equal m− 1
n−1
2
xn−12 (1− x)m−1−n−12 C.
Because this equation involves binomial coefficients, the general case is difficult to solve.
But by fixing n andm we can solve explicitly for the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria. We
find that a mixed-strategy equilibrium exists only if C/g is sufficiently large. However, there
then also exist two mixed-strategy equilibria (implying that the total number of symmetric
equilibria is three).
The equilibria have very different comparative statics. For the first equilibrium (denoted
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by x1), an increase in the ratio C/g reduces the probability a legislator votes for the tariff; in
the second equilibrium (denoted by x2) the opposite holds.
18 Figure 1 shows these equilibria
for n = m ∈ {3, 9, 25}. We see that, for these values, as n increases the mixed-strategy
equilibria converge to zero and one, respectively.19 Thus, even under the extension of mixed-
strategy equilibria, with positive probability inefficient legislation is approved.
5.3 Sequential voting
When the benefits to the districts from the investment are sufficiently small compared to
the cost of the tariff, the equilibrium is not in dominant strategies. In such a case, our result
requires that voting be simultaneous, and this subsection shows that sequential voting can
avoid inefficient collective decisions. We argue, however, that sequential voting is rare in
practice.
Suppose that legislators vote in an exogenously given order. We find a subgame-perfect
equilibrium by backward induction. Consider the legislator voting last. Depending how
preceding legislators voted, either equation (1), (2), or (3) captures the voting situation.
Notice that a legislator who opposes the investment strictly prefers to vote against the tariff.
18We see x1 as a more appealing equilibrium than x2, because it is plausible that as legislation becomes
more inefficient it is less often approved. There are further reasons to focus on x1. Consider n = 3 and
suppose that x1 and x2 exist. Denote by A(x) and B(x) the expected payoffs from voting for and against
the tariff, respectively, when the two other legislators vote for the tariff with probability x. We have that
A′(x) < 0, A′′(x) > 0, B′(x) < 0, B′′(x) < 0, and A(0) > B(0) > A(1) > B(1). Hence, A(x) and
B(x) intersect twice (at x1 and at x2), and expected payoffs are strictly higher at x1. Another reasoning
could be based on a simultaneous version of Cournot’s tatonnement process, adapted to symmetric mixed-
strategy equilibria. Consider an equilibrium xˆ to be (locally) stable if given a collective mistake in which
everyone mixes with probability xˆ+m, where m ∈ {−, } with  > 0, the following holds for all legislators:
A(xˆ+m) > B(xˆ+m) if m < 0, and A(xˆ+m) < B(xˆ+m) if m > 0. Similarly, consider an equilibrium xˆ to
be (locally) unstable if for some legislator the opposite inequality holds. Given how A(x) and B(x) intersect,
x1 is stable, whereas x2 is unstable.
19Further simulations for larger n yield chaotic mixing probabilities, which could arise from rounding errors
in the computer program Mathematica.
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A legislator who favors the investment and is not pivotal votes for the tariff; otherwise he
votes against.
Consider now the penultimate legislator. Anticipating the choice of the legislator vot-
ing last, the legislator votes for the tariff if he both favors the investment and his vote is
not pivotal; otherwise he votes against. Since this behavior holds for all legislators, going
backwards through the voting game we see that no pivotal legislator votes for the tariff. All
legislators favoring the investment vote for the tariff until just one vote is missing to approve
the tariff. All other legislators vote against. Observe that when voting is sequential, at least
one legislator is pivotal. This never happens under the simultaneous procedure.
It is also straightforward to see that this solution is unique. We summarize with
Proposition 3 Under sequential voting there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium,
in which the tariff is rejected. In this equilibrium, of the legislators favoring the investment,
only the first (n− 1)/2 in the voting order vote for the tariff; all others vote against.
Sequential voting can avoid the inefficient collective decisions. But sequential voting ap-
pears to be rare. Even voting procedures that at first sight look sequential are effectively
simultaneous. For instance, the US House of Representatives employs several voting pro-
cedures. Under the roll-call vote congressmen cast votes as their names are called. Since
calling more than 400 names is very time consuming, this method is used infrequently. A
similar method exists in the US Senate. Under these procedures in both the House and the
Senate, however, a vote can be changed while the count remains open, so voting is effectively
simultaneous.
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5.4 The firm’s beliefs about a district’s type
We assumed thus far that the firm infers that a district whose legislator voted for the tariff
favors the investment. This assumption simplified the analysis by allowing us to look at
Nash equilibria of the simultaneous voting game rather than at Perfect Bayesian equilibria
of the whole game. This inference, however, is not the only possibility.
In a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium the legislators and the firm all behave optimally, given
their beliefs about the others’ actions; these beliefs are, in equilibrium, correct. Notice first
that the equilibrium established in Proposition 1 is still an equilibrium when we endogenize
the firm’s beliefs in this way, because we already checked informally that the firm’s inference
is consistent with the voting behavior of the legislators.
But other equilibria exist. Consider the following possible equilibrium. All legislators
who favor the investment vote against the tariff, while all others vote for the tariff. The
firm infers that a district whose legislator voted for the tariff opposes the investment, so
that the firm invests in a district whose legislator voted against the tariff. Clearly, the firm’s
inference is consistent with the legislator’s voting behavior. Given this inference and this
voting profile, at least 1 + (n + 1)/2 legislators vote against the tariff. Therefore equation
(1) becomes
0 >
pi
h+ 1
, (4)
where h is the number of other legislators who vote against the tariff. This inequality implies
that all legislators behave optimally and that this profile is indeed an equilibrium. Moreover,
this equilibrium is efficient.
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Thus, depending on the beliefs of the firm, in one equilibrium the legislature approves
the tariff, and in another equilibrium it does not. So in one sense the beliefs of the firm
determine (partially) the equilibrium. Given that the firm wants the tariff, it will attempt
to induce beliefs by legislators that generate the inefficient equilibrium.
Another argument in favor of the equilibrium in Proposition 1 rests on the plausible
conjecture that votes correlate with attitudes toward the firm due to other, unmodeled,
aspects of the payoffs. Suppose legislators want to establish a consistent voting record
reflecting the preferences of the district represented. Consider a legislator representing a
district that opposes the investment who in the alternative equilibrium must vote for the
tariff. Such a vote in favor yields zero payoffs, while a vote against the tariff gives the
benefit of a consistent voting record at the risk of attracting the firm to the district. If the
former is high, the cost of the investment b is low, or many other legislators vote against the
tariff, then a deviation from the alternative equilibrium is profitable, while the equilibrium
in Proposition 1 is unaffected.
6 Extensions
The existence of an equilibrium in which the legislature adopts a tariff that all districts oppose
continues to hold under varying conditions. This section considers several extensions. We
allow for each legislator to be unsure about the preferences of other legislators, for a district
favoring the investment to offer additional incentives to the firm to invest there, for capital
mobility, for a secret ballot, and for retrospective voting. Under all these extensions, an
equilibrium in which the tariff is adopted continues to exist. Thus, this section shows that
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our conclusion is robust.
6.1 Uncertainty about other legislators’ types
Here we extend the analysis to allow each legislator to be unsure about how many other
legislators favor the investment. Let each legislator believe that any other legislator favors
the investment with probability γ. In the following we establish values of γ for which it is an
equilibrium for all legislators favoring the investment to vote for the tariff and for all others
to vote against.
Consider a legislator who favors the investment. Suppose all other legislators favoring the
investment vote for the tariff, while all other legislators use their strictly dominant strategy
and vote against the tariff. A legislator who votes for the tariff trades off the greater chance
of getting the investment with the larger probability that the tariff is approved and the costs
C must be incurred. More precisely, expected payoffs are
n−1∑
k=0
n− 1
k
 γk(1− γ)n−1−k gk + 1 −
n−1∑
k=n−1
2
n− 1
k
 γk(1− γ)n−1−k C.
On the other hand, a legislator who votes against the tariff could attract the firm’s
investment only if all other legislators vote against the tariff. In addition, if a majority votes
for the tariff, the cost C is imposed even without the vote of the legislator in question; that
is
(1− γ)n−1 g
n
−
n−1∑
k=n+1
2
n− 1
k
 γk(1− γ)n−1−k C.
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The legislator strictly prefers to vote for the tariff if and only if
0 < ∆(γ) :=
(1− γ)n−1 n− 1
n
g +
n−1∑
k=1
n− 1
k
 γk(1− γ)n−1−k gk + 1 −
n− 1
n−1
2
 γ n−12 (1− γ)n−12 C.
The following Proposition says that in many circumstances the previous inequality holds,
implying that Proposition 1 is robust to the introduction of ‘noise.’
Proposition 4 For any C, g, and n, there exists a γˆ ∈ [1/2, 1) such that for all γ ∈ [γˆ, 1],
it is an equilibrium for each legislator who favors the investment to vote for the tariff, while
all other legislators vote against.
Proof. Notice that g(n − 1)/n > g/n and g/(k + 1) ≥ g/n, for all k = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1.
Hence,
∆(γ) >
g
n
−
n− 1
n−1
2
 γ n−12 (1− γ)n−12 C := ∆ˆ(γ).
Notice that ∆ˆ(γ) is continuous and differentiable. Moreover, it attains a unique minimum
at γ = 1/2 and we have ∆ˆ(γ = 0) = ∆ˆ(γ = 1) = g/n. Suppose that ∆ˆ(γ = 1/2) ≥ 0. Then
choose γˆ = 1/2. Suppose that ∆ˆ(γ = 1/2) < 0. Then there exist two values, γ1 and γ2 with
0 < γ1 < 1/2 < γ2 < 1, such that ∆ˆ(γ1) = ∆ˆ(γ2) = 0. In this case choose γˆ = γ2. Q.E.D.
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6.2 Tax breaks and other inducements to invest
In our benchmark analysis, a legislator can attract the firm’s investment only by voting for
the tariff. But districts compete for investments in additional ways, for example, by giving
tax breaks.
To consider such an extension, we suppose that a legislator’s preferences or constituency
may sometimes differ from that of a local official who engages in lobbying—the two types may
be elected at different times, have faced different turnouts, or be elected from jurisdictions
of different sizes. Let the firm prefer to invest in a district whose legislator and local officials
all favor the investment. Such joint support may increase the firm’s confidence that voters
support the investment, or may be necessary for the firm to navigate political constraints.
Moreover, if the legislator knows the attitudes of other officials in the jurisdiction, he will
vote for the tariff only if the officials will also offer the firm benefits.
Thus, the firm will not invest in a district whose legislator voted against the tariff.
Districts whose legislators voted for the tariff compete simultaneously with one another to
attract the firm’s investment. District i offers to pay the firm ei if the firm locates in the
district.
Assume that the firm gives priority to districts whose legislators voted for the tariff.
Among such districts, it favors the one that offered the highest payment.
We find a subgame-perfect equilibrium by backward induction. Notice that in the last
stage a district opposing the investment sets ei = 0, as incentives are costly. Denote the
number of districts enjoying priority and lobbying (actively) for the investment by l. Let the
lobbying stage be described by the following assumption.
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Assumption 1 The lobbying stage has a unique symmetric equilibrium, with the following
holding for each district which has priority:
• A district favoring the investment exerts effort e∗i (g, l), with ∂e∗i (g, l)/∂l > 0, and
obtains an expected payoff of u(g, l) > 0.
• A district opposing the investment exerts effort e∗i (−b, l) = 0 and obtains an expected
payoff of u(−b, l) ≤ 0.
Building on Yates (2011), who analyzes a winner pay contest and interprets his model as
two states attracting a manufacturing plant through a package of tax and other incentives,
we give an example that fulfills Assumption 1. Consider a district indexed by i; denote the
sum of the efforts of the other districts by E =
∑
j 6=i ej. Assume that after the competition
each district’s chance of attracting the investment is described by the simple ratio contest
success function ei/(ei + E).
20 In contrast to a standard contest model, however, only the
district that attracts the investment incurs the cost of its effort (or pays the firm the incentive
offered). Under these assumptions district i maximizes
ei
ei + E
(g − ei).
In the unique equilibrium with symmetric pure strategies of the contest game, a district that
favors the investment chooses e∗(g, l) = g(l − 1)/(2l − 1) and obtains an expected payoff of
u(g, l) = g/(2l − 1) > 0. A district that opposes the investment chooses e∗(−b, l) = 0 and
receives u(−b, l) = 0.
20If all districts with priority offer no incentives, we assume that all districts have the same win probability
1/h, where h is the number of districts with priority.
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Such behavior implies that in the initial voting stage equation (1) becomes
u(pi, l) > 0 if k > 0 and (5)
pi > u(pi,m) if k = 0, (6)
where again k denotes the number of other legislators who vote for the tariff. On the other
hand, equations (2) and (3), become
u(pi, l)− C > −C and (7)
u(pi, l)− C > 0. (8)
Notice that for a legislator who opposes the investment, (pi = −b), it is now a weakly
(rather than strictly) dominant strategy to vote against the tariff, as a district can now signal
its opposition to the firm’s investment by setting ei = 0 in the contest stage.
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Again we search for equilibria with symmetric pure strategies. We start with the voting
profile in which all legislators favoring the investment vote for the tariff, and all others use
their weakly dominant strategy and vote against the tariff. Consider legislators who favor the
investment. By assumption at least (n + 1)/2 other legislators vote for the tariff. Thus, no
individual’s vote is decisive and the trade-off in equation (7) is relevant. Because the district
gains priority, its legislator does better by voting for the tariff than by voting against. The
firm is strictly worse-off if priority is allocated to fewer districts and would not invest in a
21Contrary to the benchmark, when u(−b, l) = 0 it is now an equilibrium for all legislators to vote for
the tariff. A legislator who opposes the investment might vote for the tariff because his district does not
compete actively at the lobbying stage and, thus, will not attract the firm’s investment. Anticipating this,
he is indifferent between voting for and against the tariff.
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district whose legislator voted against the tariff. As before the voting behavior is consistent
with the firm’s inference.22
As in the benchmark, no equilibrium has all legislators vote against the tariff. For if they
did, a legislator who deviated by supporting the tariff would have his district the only one
to gain priority and would be sure of attracting the investment (see equation 6).
6.3 Capital mobility
A central assumption is that a firm can make a choice that benefits one district more than
another. An obvious such choice is where to invest. We would then expect a firm to exert
more political influence if capital is mobile than if it is not. We would not expect, for
example, a mining company in Wyoming to threaten to move to Rhode Island.
But whereas capital mobility within a nation can increase a firm’s political influence, in-
ternational capital mobility may reduce it. Consider outsourcing of call centers, and suppose
that some districts in the country want to attract such jobs. If each district believes that
the firm will find lower costs in India than anywhere in the US, no US district could attract
the jobs by supporting a policy the call-industry favors. Similarly, greater capital mobility
across member states of the European Union should reduce the political power of special
interests within each state, but increase the power of special interests when dealing with the
European Commission or with the Council of Ministers.
It turns out that for this reasoning to hold it is crucial that no legislator can attract the
22Notice that even if at the last stage competition is very fierce and the firm can appropriate all the rent
from matching to a district favoring the investment, it is still an equilibrium for a legislator who favors the
investment to vote for the tariff. If the lobbying stage is modeled as a first-price auction, in the undominated
pure strategy Nash equilibrium a district that favors the investment obtains the expected payoff u(g, l) = 0,
see Alcalde and Dahm (2011). That is, any one legislator gains nothing from voting against the tariff when
a majority of other legislators vote for it, and might as well vote for it.
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investment by supporting the tariff. If—returning to the example of call centers—there is an
arbitrarily small probability that the firm invests in the United States, our result is robust.
Suppose that a firm can invest in either of two countries, indexed by 1, 2. The countries
vote simultaneously on the tariff and then the firm decides where to invest. The firm prefers
to invest in a country that approved the tariff. So, if one country approves the tariff (denoted
by A), while the other rejects it (denoted by R), investment probabilities p are one and zero,
respectively. If both approve or reject the tariff, each has a strictly positive probability of
attracting the firm’s investment. So denoting by di ∈ {A,R} the countries’ decisions and by
nc the total number of districts in country c, we have
p1 =

pˆA1 ∈
(
1
n1+n2
, 1− 1
n1+n2
)
if d1 = d2 = A
pˆR1 ∈
(
1
n1+n2
, 1− 1
n1+n2
)
if d1 = d2 = R
1 if d1 = A and d2 = R
0 if d1 = R and d2 = A

and p2 = 1− p1.
Consider the voting decision of a legislator in country i. Denoting by kc the number of
other legislators who vote for the tariff in country c, equations (1), (2) and (3), become
pi
pi
ki + 1
>

0 if ki + kj > 0
pi
ni+nj
if ki + kj = 0
 (9)
pi
pi
ki + 1
− C > −C and (10)
pi
pi
ki + 1
− C > 0. (11)
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Notice that when country j rejects the tariff, equations (10) and (11) coincide with equations
(2) and (3). Note also that for a legislator who dislikes the investment (pi = −b), it is now a
weakly dominant strategy to vote against the tariff.
Consider again symmetric pure-strategy equilibria and start with the voting profile in
which all legislators favoring the investment vote for the tariff, and all others use their
weakly dominant strategy to vote against the tariff. Consider a legislator who favors the
investment. By assumption, at least (ni+1)/2 other legislators vote for the tariff. Therefore
no individual’s vote is decisive and the trade-off in equation (10) is relevant. Since pi > 0,
each legislator who favors the investment strictly prefers voting for the tariff. As before, this
is the unique symmetric equilibrium and the voting behavior is consistent with the firm’s
inference.
Proposition 5 There is a unique pure-strategy symmetric Nash equilibrium. In this equi-
librium each legislator who favors the investment votes for the tariff; each other legislator
votes against the tariff. Both countries adopt the tariff.
Notice, lastly, that the outcome is worse under capital mobility than under the bench-
mark. Both countries pass inefficient legislation, though the firm will invest in only one.
Thus, capital mobility within a nation and international capital mobility can increase a
firm’s political influence and the inefficiency of political decisions.
6.4 Secret ballot
Capital mobility can also be used by a firm to overcome the difficulty that under a secret
ballot it does not know how any one legislator voted.
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Consider the setting of the previous subsection. Denote by hc the number of legislators
who vote for the tariff in country c. Contrary to the previous assumption, suppose that
pˆ1 = h1/(h1 + h2) = 1− pˆ2, when h1 + h2 > 0 and pˆ1 = 1/2 otherwise. Notice that, if votes
are public, Proposition 5 is unaffected by this alternative assumption.
Assume that the larger the number of legislators who voted for the tariff, the more likely
is the firm to invest in the country at all; for example as specified in pˆ1. Because the firm
does not know how any legislator voted, if the firm invests it chooses a location at random.
Thus the larger the number of legislators who voted for the tariff, the greater is the expected
gain to a district that favors the investment. Consider a legislator who wants the investment
in his district. Increased support for the tariff increases the probability that any particular
district will get the investment. No equilibrium has all legislators who favor the investment
vote against the tariff. And it is an equilibrium for them to vote for it.
6.5 Retrospective voting
Our approach can also work if voters vote for candidates retrospectively rather than prospec-
tively. That entails less sophistication or strategic voting by voters, relying instead on the
sophistication of elected officials who seek reelection.
Modify the previous assumptions by supposing that voters in a district are more likely
to re-elect an incumbent the greater their welfare during his term before the election. Then
in those districts where voters favor the investment the incumbent can increase his chances
of winning re-election by voting for the tariff, thereby increasing the chances that the firm
will invest in his district.
31
7 Conclusion
In contrast to standard approaches to lobbying which view special interests as seeking favors
from voters or their representatives, we reversed this structure: we let legislators seek a favor
from the firm and in return support a policy the firm favors.
This explanation of political influence has several attractive features. It is consistent
with the observed low level of spending by firms on political influence. It is consistent with
firms obtaining benefits without the need to bribe legislators; the behavior explored here
may dominate direct bribery not only because bribery is costly and illegal. Indeed, a firm
desiring to learn the political preferences of a district may not want to bribe the incumbent
legislator. For if the firm did and he voted for the tariff, the firm would not learn whether
his district favors the industry and the investment.
In contrast to standard theories of influence, the equilibria we described are time consistent—
legislators may vote for an inefficient policy, and the firm can indeed prefer to invest in a
district whose legislator voted for the tariff. Our approach has the additional attraction
of applying to multi-dimensional policies, for instance several tariffs for different industries
decided upon at the same time. Though the cost from a given tariff to a district may be
higher when other tariffs are imposed, our results hold, since they hold for any level of these
costs.
The behavior we described can apply to policies other than tariffs or to incentives other
than new investment. What is important is that an outside party reward a vote for the policy.
This outside party may consist of voters, when congressmen seek to establish a particular
voting record to run for higher office. Our model then suggests that Members of Congress
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may vote for a policy that they prefer be rejected, and that all of them would be better off
if they jointly agreed to oppose the policy. Another example is a federal rescue program
designed to save a firm threatened by bankruptcy. The favor that voters seek could then be
to avoid closure of branches, that is, disinvestment rather than investment in the district.
A similar argument can apply to corruption. A corrupt mayor may tell each voting bloc
or district that he will favor it if they vote for him, and otherwise will not. An equilibrium
is for each district to support the corrupt incumbent mayor. For if any one district voted
against the mayor, and the mayor had to prioritize service, then he may well give the district
that opposed him a lower priority. The district would therefore not have affected the election,
but would have hurt itself.
The model has several empirical implications. Following the logic given by Grossman
and Helpman (2005), the behavior we consider applies to majoritarian systems, where a
legislator knows local conditions, and wants to benefit his own district. But it does not well
apply to countries using proportional voting, where parties compete nationally. We would
therefore predict higher tariffs in countries with majoritarian systems than in countries with
proportional systems. That is the pattern found by Evans (2009) and by Hatfield and Hauk
(2010) in their empirical studies.
An additional prediction is that firms with high capital mobility exert greater political
influence than do firms with little choice of where to invest. Thus, our model would not
predict high tariffs on agriculture, because agriculture does not move from district to district.
And indeed, Evans and Obradovich (2009) find that majoritarian systems do not show a bias
toward agricultural tariffs.
For some other predictions, we do not have relevant data. We expect firms that seek favors
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from government to avoid investing overseas. Lastly, legislators with a stronger preference for
investment in their districts are more likely to vote for policies that the firm contemplating
the investment wants.
Further support of our theory is the quotation in the Introduction from an interview
with former US politician Lawrence O’Brien, whose account of the political power of the
National Football League fits closely with our key argument. Future interviews with other
former politicians or with former CEOs of large companies should complement this body of
knowledge.
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